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‘history is theatre’: the secrets 
to the success of the Curtin and 
Roosevelt mass media strategies, 
1941-451
how Curtin and Roosevelt developed the allied mass media
The notion that ‘[h]istory is theatre’ affirms the importance of studying films 
and other cultural products.2 This paper delves into rarely viewed press, film, 
and radio archives to discover the groundbreaking mass media strategies 
developed by the wartime Australian Prime Minister John Curtin, and United 
States President Franklin Delano Roosevelt to persuade journalists and public 
audiences to support their alliance during World War II (hereafter ‘the war’).
There is a paucity of comprehensive study into the mass media strategies devel-
oped by Curtin and Roosevelt; strategies that give us detailed insight into their 
partnership. The rapid expansion of new radio and film industries converged 
with a global conflict at the same time as two popular leaders were elected. Both 
men, who were skilful communicators known for their commitment to peaceful 
foreign policies before the war, established precedents for the development of 
closer press relationships, more interactive news conferences, war newsreels, 
and radio talks that strengthened their friendships with journalists and helped 
them to achieve their political aims. The two leaders advanced media innova-
tions to maintain voters’ enthusiasm for the Allied ‘beat Hitler first’ strategy while 
their electorates were mostly engaged by the war in Asia.
1 I would like to thank the editors of Melbourne Historical Journal. Also I appreciate the 
support of Associate Professors Bobbie Oliver and Steve Mickler of Curtin University, as 
well as Lesley Wallace, David Wylie and staff members of the John Curtin Prime Ministerial 
Library.
2 Greg Dening, “Performing on the Beaches of the Mind: An Essay,” History and Theory 41 
(2002): 1.
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After the Japanese bombing of the US naval base at Pearl Harbor on 7 Decem-
ber 1941, Roosevelt used his ‘fireside chat’ radio talks to reassure national and 
overseas audiences that the Allies were ‘forming a band of steel’ to defeat their 
Pacific foes.3 The next year he broadcast stirring rhetoric to overcome public 
apathy towards protracted Nazi German battles.4 When Japanese forces at-
tacked Darwin on 19 February 1942, press editors proclaimed, ‘the war comes 
home to Australia’ and that this would be the country’s ‘greatest hour’.5 Curtin 
developed communication methods similar to Roosevelt’s media strategies as 
he tried to persuade Allied populations to accept a ‘certain minimum effort’ to 
defend Australia as they strove to ‘beat Hitler first’.6 
The Australian Labor Party Prime Minister was described as a ‘onetime mild-
mannered trade-union journalist’, whose words ‘rolled like Walt Whitman’s’ 
when he addressed US listeners.7 He was delivering his nation’s first direct 
radio broadcast from Canberra to American citizens. Praising ‘the people 
of America’ during the peak broadcasting time of 7pm to 8pm on Friday 14 
March 1942, Curtin spoke of their shared commitment to ‘total warfare’ and 
the importance of preserving Australia as a democratic ‘bastion’ between the 
US west coast and Axis enemies. ‘I say to you that the saving of Australia is 
the saving of America’s west coast’, Curtin asserted during his talk, which 
was disseminated by more than 700 US radio stations connected to the Na-
tional Broadcasting Company of America, as well as reaching audiences in 
the British Isles, Canada, Europe, and South America.8 During his direct ap-
peal to Americans, about ninety thousand US servicemen were in Australia.9 
As Curtin and the Democratic US President governed their nations during politi-
cal, economic, and social upheavals, they used their journalism backgrounds 
3 F. D. Roosevelt, “Fireside Chat”, The American Presidency Project [hereafter Project], ed. 
John T. Woolley and Gerhard Peters (24 December 1943), http://www.presidency.ucsb.
edu/news_conferences.php
4 Richard W. Steele, “News of the ‘Good War’,” Journalism Quarterly 62 (1985).
5 The Age, 20 February 1942, 2; The West Australian [hereafter WA], 20 February 1942, 4.
6 John Curtin, “Broadcast by the Prime Minister from London,” Digest 81 (1944): 53-6.
7 Time, 23 March 1942, 27. The following 1940s press articles lacked bylines.
8 John Curtin, “Broadcast to America,” Commonwealth Government: Digest of Decisions and 
Announcements and Important Speeches by the Prime Minister (Right Hon. John Curtin) 
[hereafter Digest] 22 (1942): 9-13. The Canberra Times [hereafter TCT], 16 March 1942; 
WA, 16 March 1942.
9 John Curtin, “Prime Minister’s Review,” Digest 81 (1944); and, Kay Saunders and Helen 
Taylor, “The Reception of Black American Servicemen in Australia During World War II,” 
Journal of Black Studies 25 (1995): 331-48.
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to develop friendly, egalitarian, professional relationships with reporters. Their 
media associations helped them to win decisive electoral victories as voters sup-
ported a war which ‘we are all in’, as Roosevelt remarked.10 In a letter to Curtin 
on 3 January 1944, he wrote: ‘[a]s we used to say in my rowing days, Australia 
is “pulling its weight in the boat”’.11 Early the next year, the news of both their 
deepening health problems were managed carefully as part of the prevailing 
censorship systems to prevent publications that might damage public morale 
or help enemies. Correspondents generally agreed with government demands 
to withhold the detailed health diagnoses. Therefore the news of Roosevelt’s 
death on 12 April 1945 was portrayed as ‘sudden and unexpected’ in America; 
similar reports followed with Curtin’s death in Australia on 5 July in the same 
year.12 Japan’s formal surrender took place in September. Although Curtin and 
Roosevelt had benefited from censorship, they had demonstrated a personal 
commitment to cultivating positive government-media communications.
allied leaders and precedents in press, film, and radio communications
While scholars have portrayed Curtin as developing Australia’s international 
standing as an independent nation, biographers have focussed on the young 
man from the mining town of Creswick, Victoria, and his rapid ascension in his 
journalism career. Curtin’s journalism skills and media contacts were signifi-
cant in assisting him to win the federal seat of Fremantle, WA, in November 
1928 and then to ascend to the Labor leadership in 1935. After a protracted 
period of instability between 1939 and early 1941 with four successive Prime 
Ministers, Curtin was appointed to the Prime Ministership on 7 October 1941. 
Although Curtin’s background contrasted with the patrician New York upbring-
ing of Roosevelt, who enjoyed referring to his undergraduate experience as 
the managing editor and president of his university’s newspaper, The Harvard 
Crimson, Curtin’s press strategies resembled those of the US leader.13 Just 
10 F. D. Roosevelt, “Chat,” Project, 9 December 1941, 12 October 1942.
11 F. D. Roosevelt, “Letter to John Curtin,” Australian Government Department of Foreign 
Affairs and Trade (3 January 1944), http://www.info.dfat.gov.au/info/historical/HistDocs.nsf/
vVolume/834A9F0BC9913EAFCA256B7E001E3F3B.
12 Australian Prime Minister’s Office, Scrapbooks compiled by the Prime Minister’s office 
[hereafter Scrapbooks] 4 (5-6 July 1945); The Sydney Morning Herald [hereafter SMH], 6 
July 1945, 3; and, Megan O’Shaughnessy, “Review of The Hidden Campaign: Roosevelt’s 
Health and the 1944 Election,” by Hugh E. Evans, Rhetoric & Public Affairs 6 (2003), 793.
13 P. M. Boffey, “Franklin Delano Roosevelt at Harvard,” The Harvard Crimson (13 December 
1957), http://www.thecrimson.com/article.aspx?ref=108910
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as Roosevelt was the first President to employ a full-time press secretary, 
Curtin appointed Australia’s first full-time Prime Ministerial press secretary, 
Don Rodgers, in 1941.14 Roosevelt generally conducted twice-weekly news 
conferences, held at different times to give an equal preference to morning and 
evening news deadlines during his four Presidential terms. This amounted to 
998 interviews during slightly more than 12 years. As he answered journalists’ 
impromptu questions, provided ‘off-the-record’ and ‘background’ information, 
as well as allowed his words to be quoted directly on occasions, the confer-
ences represented a significant departure from the more formal, structured 
briefings provided by his predecessor, Herbert Hoover.15 Likewise, Curtin’s 
news interviews were unprecedented in their frequency, openness, and in-
formality in Australia in which he made exceptional provisions for a ‘travelling 
media circus’ to accompany him ‘everywhere’.16 He generally held twice-
daily media briefings, including weekends.17 While such highly confidential 
interviews might not be possible for today’s increasingly competitive Parlia-
mentary Press Gallery, wartime correspondents generally honoured Curtin’s 
off-the-record information as part of the prescribed censorship system.18
Both leaders depended on speechwriters to cultivate their media connections to 
working-class audiences. Roosevelt often asked for six to eight drafts from his 
official speechwriter, Samuel Rosenman, and reread the manuscripts so often 
that he almost memorised them.19 Although his media statements, articles, and 
14 David Black, “The Art of the Possible: Creating an independent Australian foreign policy 
1901-45,” John Curtin Prime Ministerial L brary [hereafter JCPML], (2004), http://john.curtin.
edu.au/artoftheposs ble/printessay.html. Christopher Hubbard, An Australian Introduction to 
International Relations (Frenchs Forest: Pearson Education Australia, 2008); and, Bobbie 
Oliver, “Shaping the Nation,” JCPML (2001), http://john.curtin.edu.au/shapingthenation/
index.htm. Diana Knott Martinelli and Jeff Mucciarone, “New deal public relations: A glimpse 
into F.D.R. press secretary Stephen Early’s work,” Public Relations Review 33 (2007): 49-
57; Donald K. Rodgers, “Interview by Mel Pratt,” JCPML (1971).
15 Richard M. Perloff, Political Communication: Politics, Press, and Public in America 
(Mahwah, NJ: Erlbaum, 1998); and, Harry S. Truman, “The President’s News Conference,” 
Project, 17 April 1945.
16 Joseph A. Alexander, “Interview by Mel Pratt,” JCPML, np. (1971).
17 C. J. Lloyd, Parliament and the Press: The Federal Parliamentary Press Gallery, 1901-88 
(Carlton: Melbourne University Press, 1998); and, Geoffrey Serle, For Australia and Labor 
(Perth: JCPML, 1998).
18 John Hirst, Looking for Australia (Me bourne: Black Inc., 2010); and, Lloyd, Parliament and 
the Press.
19 Earnest Bradenburg and Waldo W. Braden, “Franklin Delano Roosevelt,” History and 
Criticism of American Public Address, ed. Marie K. Hochmuth, vol. 3 (New York: Longmans, 
Green and Co., 1958).
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radio talks were prepared by Australian press secretary, Don Rodgers, Curtin too 
spoke forcefully and at length from memory during his political addresses.20 As 
Mackenzie King noted, Curtin’s diction ‘was very good, and his memory quite re-
markable’ when he spoke to the Canadian Parliament for more than 40 minutes.21 
Curtin and Roosevelt first met on 25 April in South Carolina at Hobcaw Bar-
ony, which was the hunting and fishing lodge of Roosevelt’s adviser, Bernard 
Mannes Baruch. The two leaders met again for a one-and-a-half hour discus-
sion in Washington D.C. on 5 June.22 Afterwards Curtin did not disclose any 
information about Roosevelt’s health problems.23 During the same era, Brit-
ish Prime Minister, Winston S. Churchill, and Canada’s leader, William Lyon 
Mackenzie King, were also former newspaper journalists who cultivated their 
media relationships.24 However, neither Churchill nor King held daily news 
interviews nor did they employ full-time press secretaries during their Prime 
Ministerships.25 Although relationships between media and wartime leaders 
of various countries were strong at this time, those formed by Curtin and 
Roosevelt were patricularly well-developed. Curtin and Roosevelt were aided 
by censorship and developed respectful relationships with correspondents.26
All four Allied leaders enthusiastically embraced the relatively new media of radio 
and wartime newsreels. Scholars described Roosevelt’s radio ‘fireside chats’ as 
setting ‘the gold standard for American political oratory’ because of his ability to 
project a warm, fatherly persona to voters. Based on different historical accounts, 
Roosevelt delivered between 25 and 31 ‘fireside chats’ from 3 December 1933 
to 6 December 1944.27 In like manner to Roosevelt, the classically educated 
Churchill turned to the radio as a primary medium to communicate with war-
time audiences with his 1941 broadcast to the US Congress being described 
as ‘one of the greatest occasions in history’.28 The diaries of Canada’s King 
20 Richard Hall, “Spin Doctor,” NLA News 7 (1998). British Movietone News, Newsreels of 
Curtin, 1942-1945 (JCPML, 1942-45).
21 W. L. M. King, The Diaries of William Lyon Mackenzie King, (Ottawa: Library and Archives 
Canada, 16 December 1944), http://www.collectionscanada.gc.ca/databases/king/index-e.
html, 1 June 1944, 565.
22 Digest 81 (1944): 35.
23 Joseph A. Alexander, “Papers 1833-1957,” 1941-44, National Library of Australia [hereafter 
NLA]; Harold Cox, “Typescript reports, 1944-1964,” 1944-45, NLA; and, Clem Lloyd and 
Richard Hall, eds., Backroom Briefings: John Curtin’s War (Canberra: NLA, 1997).
24 King, The Diaries. Charles E. Lysaght, “Brendan Bracken: The Fantasist Whose Dreams 
Came True,” Finest Hour 113 (2001-2).
25 Lloyd, Press; and, Time, 12 June 1944, JCPML.
26 Alexander, “Interview” and “Papers”; and, Steele, “War”.
27 Elvin T. Lim, “The Lion and the Lamb,” Rhetoric & Public Affairs 6 (2003): 437-64.
28 Alexander, “Papers,” 27 December 1941, np. 
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indicated that he rehearsed speeches carefully before live radio addresses. 
For example, on 3 September 1939, he wrote of devoting the entire afternoon 
to ‘work out’ his speech about Britain’s declaration of war on Germany; this 
was ‘the largest broadcast’ made from Canada at the time, reaching listeners 
‘worldwide’. For King, the radio speeches were vital for persuading French 
Canadians to support the war in Europe.29 During Curtin’s first month in office 
he initiated the installation of a powerful new shortwave transmitting station 
that connected Australian radio networks to the US.30 Thereafter he delivered 
at least five radio talks directly to Americans.31 Furthermore he sponsored 
war newsreels with the U.S. Army Signal Corps during General Douglas 
MacArthur’s Philippines campaign in 1944.32 The media interaction between 
Australia and America during this time suggests that Roosevelt’s innovative 
use of new media had some influence on Curtin’s radio and film strategies.
The close ties between the Australian and American leaders were further high-
lighted through the media in 1941. In a highly publicised editorial, Curtin gave 
a New Year message in which he stated: ‘Without any inhibitions of any kind, I 
make it quite clear that Australia looks to America, free of any pangs as to our 
traditional links or kinship with the United Kingdom’.33 The now bureau chief of 
The Herald at Canberra, Alexander, requested that Curtin write an editorial for 
his Melbourne-based newspaper.34 Alexander’s employer, Sir Keith Murdoch, 
decided to transfer the copy, originally planned for the magazine pages, and 
elevate it to the front-page status on the issue of Saturday 27 December 1941.35 
In his diary, Alexander referred to ‘the immense sensation’ caused by Curtin’s 
‘bluntly’ worded statement. ‘The Sunday Telegraph pinched it and had it today’, 
29 King, Diaries, 3 September 1939, 923, 925; 24 April 1942.
30 The Canberra Times, 31 October 1941.
31 Curtin’s US radio talks were broadcast on 14 March 1942, 26 January 1943, 5 July 1943, 17 
March 1944, and, 26 April 1944. JCPML, “Index to John Curtin’s speeches,” 2007, JCPML. 
32 Australian Government Department of Information and U.S. Army Signal Corps, At The 
Front: 1939-1945 (JCPML, 1944-5). As a result of Curtin’s support of his nation’s fledg-
ling film industry, a documentary team won Australia’s first Academy Award. The prize was 
given for the 1942 newsreel Kokoda Front Line! that portrayed Australian soldiers fighting 
on the Kokoda Track, New Guinea. Ken G. Hall, Kokoda Front Line! (Australia: Cinesound 
Productions, 1942). Curtin also appeared in a newsreel of US First Lady Eleanor Roo-
sevelt’s Canberra visit during her five-week tour of the South Pacific in 1943. ScreenSound 
Australia, Mrs Roosevelt’s Visit To Canberra, 1943 (JCPML, 1943).
33 John Curtin, “The Task Ahead,” The Herald, 27 December 1941, 1.
34 Alexander, “Papers,” 28 December 1941.
35 David Black, “Menzies and Curtin in World War Two,” JCPML (2006), http://john.curtin.edu.
au/ww2leaders; and, Allan Fraser, “Interview by Mel Pratt,” 1972-3, JCPML.
caryn coatney
45
Alexander noted. ‘Other Sunday papers gave it great publicity and it is being 
widely discussed in England ... KM [Keith Murdoch] is very amazed about 
it’.36 By February 1944, Curtin and Roosevelt had developed a ‘very friendly 
and cooperative relationship’, supported by their media communications.37
As US correspondents portrayed Roosevelt’s death as a shock, similarly many 
Australians were reportedly astonished by the loss of Curtin.38 Both nations’ 
citizens seemed genuinely surprised by the news because journalists had 
cooperated with the two men and censorship policies by avoiding pictures of 
Roosevelt in his wheelchair or Curtin in a hospital.39 Curtin wrote to Eleanor 
Roosevelt and the new US President, Harry S. Truman, that Australians were 
deeply ‘shocked’ by Roosevelt’s death.40 Similar statements were made about 
Curtin after he died. For example, few Sydney residents ‘were prepared’ for 
the tragedy, with people quoted as saying they ‘didn’t think it was so near’.41 
The news was reported as tributes on US dailies’ front pages.42 By this time, 
journalists lauded the resolve the two leaders had shown in trying to remain at 
their posts to help achieve a war victory.
journalist’s private papers shed more light on crisis management
There are diaries from an influential Australian federal political journalist and 
editor, Joseph Alexander, that reveal the inner machinations of the Curtin 
administration during the Pearl Harbor crisis.43 It seems that no previous author 
has published research on his diaries as a source of insight into Curtin’s mass 
media policies. Alexander, a Parliamentary Press Gallery reporter and a self-
proclaimed member of ‘Curtin’s Circus’ of travelling correspondents, recalled that 
his diaries were ‘roughly written…in my almost unreadable handwriting…while 
the events described were red-hot in my mind’.44 The private notes became a 
36 Alexander, “Papers,” 28 December 1941, np.
37 Black, “Friendship is a sheltering tree, JCPML (2001), 225.
38 O’Shaughnessy, “Roosevelt’s health”; and, The Daily Mirror, 5 July 1945; SMH, 6 July 
1945; and, Truth, 8 July 1945. 
39 O’Shaughnessy, “Roosevelt’s health”; and, The Herald, 24 May 1945; and, SMH, 14 June 
1945.
40 John Curtin, “Death Of President Roosevelt,” Digest 99 (1945): 34.
41 SMH, 6 July 1945, 3.
42 The Chicago-Tribune, NYT, Post, 5 July 1945, 1.
43 Alexander donated his diaries to the National Library of Australia between 1944 and 
1977. At Alexander’s request, the National L brary of Australia did not make the collection 
available publicly until after his wife Catherine’s death in 1983.
44 Alexander, “Interview” and “Papers,” np.
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record of Alexander’s great esteem for Curtin, untarnished by faulty memory 
— a potential challenge posed by oral history reminiscences — and free from 
the influence of hindsight about the leader’s legacy.
Curtin’s successful news management was exemplified in Alexander’s notes 
about the events leading to the Pearl Harbor disaster. In a diary entry for Friday 
5 December 1941, Alexander wrote that he was planning to accompany Curtin 
on a train journey from Melbourne to Canberra. Immediately before the train’s 
departure, Curtin was delayed by his principal adviser, Frederick Shedden, and 
the Prime Minister recalled Alexander from his train seat to meet Don Rodgers 
at the Victoria Barracks, Melbourne, where the bipartisan Advisory War Council 
often met. Alexander noted confidentially that, ‘Rodgers warned us to be ready 
for the gravest development’ because the Prime Minister had received ‘grave 
news from America’. He affirmed, ‘we are on the brink of war with Japan’ and he 
needed to work ‘on call over the whole weekend’. The tense atmosphere eased 
because of Roosevelt’s ‘personal appeal’ to Japanese Emperor Hirohito and, 
as Alexander opined, ‘the feeling is that nothing will happen until the message 
is received but the Japanese attitude continues to be bad’.45 
While Curtin stayed at the inexpensive, austere, and non-licensed ‘Victoria 
Palace’ in Little Collins Street, the reporters spent ‘a very dreary week-end’ at 
the old Oriental Hotel.46 Melbourne was twenty hours ahead of Hawai‘i’s local 
time. Throughout Sunday night on 7 December, world radio news ‘flashes’ were 
relayed to the ‘Listening Post’ of the Australian Department of Information and 
then forwarded to Curtin’s hotel room. The next morning at 5.30am, a monitor 
picked up the ‘flash’ that ‘[t]he Japanese…have now attacked Pearl Harbor’. 
Immediately the news was repeated to a Prime Ministerial staff member in 
another room near Curtin. He and a typist began a long series of telephone 
calls. By 6.30am, Alexander received a message from Rodgers about the 
bombing. Alexander’s colleagues were informed of the tragedy by 7.30am.47 
In fact, Japanese forces invaded Malaya and Thailand virtually simultaneously 
with the assault on the US Pacific Fleet in Pearl Harbour. They also bombed 
Guam, Hong Kong, and Wake Island. Alexander’s diaries showed his support for 
45 Alexander, “Papers,” 5-7 December 1941, np.
46 Harold Cox, “Harold Cox interview”, transcript np.
47 Truth, 6 December 1942, from Scrapbooks, np.
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Australia’s right to make an independent declaration of war on Japan because 
such a declaration may:
make us a better people or may it reawaken that sense of spiritual values, 
dead or dormant, without which this country can never survive...There is a 
general sense of relief in one sense, in that we know where we stand with 
Japan. I hear it everywhere...what most felt to be inevitable.48
It appeared ‘Curtin’s Circus’ honoured this ‘off-the-record’ agreement: The 
disaster was reported as a ‘surprise attack’ by reputable international media.49 
In Australia, Curtin continuously communicated with journalists about the im-
minent crisis.
multimethod approaches
To investigate the two leaders’ journalism strategies more closely, this study has 
focused on their media management of reports in particular radio braodcasts 
on the Pearl Harbor bombing which led to the Australian and US declarations 
of war on Japan in December 1941. The broad theoretical and conceptual ap-
proaches have been derived from media and journalism studies combined with 
archival research methods developed in the discipline of history. A comparison 
will be made between Curtin and Roosevelt’s radio broadcasts, and subsequent 
Australian press coverage. This press analysis has been based on the Pew 
Research Center’s Project for Excellence in Journalism formula that a news 
article would be deemed ‘positive’ if two-thirds of the statements appeared to 
support a national leader.50 Given the limited availability of fledgling Australian 
public opinion polls, one way to ascertain whether Curtin, as well as Roosevelt, 
was a successful journalism strategist would be to investigate whether news-
paper editors favourably repeated the respective leaders’ messages.51 
48 Alexander, “Papers,” 8 December 1941, np.
49 BBC News, Japanese planes bomb Pearl Harbor (7 December 1941), http://news.bbc.
co.uk/onthisday/hi/dates/stories/december/7/newsid_3494000/3494108.stm
50 Pew Research Center’s Project for Excellence in Journalism, “Winning The Media 
Campaign,” Journalism.org (2008), http://www.journalism.org/node/13314; and, 
 Public Broadcasting Service, Experts Assess President Obama’s Strategy With Media 
(2008), http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/media/jan-june09/obama_06-24.html
51 Roy Morgan Research conducted Australia’s first major opinion polls in 1941. Michele 
Levine and Gary Morgan, “The Power of Newspaper Editorial & Advertising,” (2006), www.
roymorgan.com
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Since they addressed radio listeners when they made their Pacific War an-
nouncements, this study conducted a computer-aided, quantitative analysis 
to measure the leaders’ speaking rates and readability statistics to assess the 
effectiveness of their public communications. Recommendations varied on 
this matter of public speech, with some scholars advising a languid pace of 
one hundred words per minute while other authors advocated 125 words per 
minute.52 As part of the analysis, the Flesch readability score was calculated 
for the Curtin and Roosevelt speeches. The Flesch readability score spanned a 
hundred-point scale, with a higher score indicating the speech included simple 
language. A lower score implied the speech was more complex. The standard 
recommended writing score was between sixty and seventy. Although Rudolph 
Flesch developed his readability formula as a doctoral thesis in 1943, Allied 
governments might have been aware of the scholarly attempts to simplify the 
expression of the English language.53 Furthermore this quantitative analysis 
was expanded to include the Flesch-Kincaid score, which ranked documents 
on a US school grade level. The recommended Flesch-Kincaid score for most 
public documents was about eight, close to the reading level of ‘middle-brow’ 
newspapers and suitable for an eighth-grade student.54 These methods were 
used to determine the accessibility of the Curtin and Roosevelt speeches.
An investigation of selected photographs and newsreels was undertaken us-
ing Asa Berger’s semiotic film conventions to examine whether the visual im-
ages depicted Curtin and Roosevelt as heroic, dynamic, and strong leaders.55 
Through this new examination of rarely viewed primary sources, official and 
informal communication texts, oral histories and a comparative press analysis, 
this study found that, overall, the Australian media positively portrayed the 
leaders, along with their Pacific foreign policies.
setting media agendas on the ‘new war’
Curtin’s determination to involve Australian audiences in wartime discussions 
was evidenced by his radio broadcast to declare war on 8 December 1941. 
52 Peter Kenny, A Handbook of Public Speaking for Scientists and Engineers (London: IOP 
Publishing Ltd., 1988); and, Lim, “Lion”.
53 Louis J. Sirico Jr., “Readability Studies: How Technocentrism Can Compromise Research 
and Legal Determinations,” Villanova University School of Law, School of Law Working 
Paper Series 104 (2008): http://law.bepress.com/villanovalwps/papers/art104
54 Trevor Day, “Twelve Writing Tips for Administrative Staff,” University of Bath (2008), http://
www.bath.ac.uk/learningandteaching/resources/TwelveWritingTipsRevisedTD.pdf
55 Anders Hansen, et al., Mass Communication Research Methods (Basingstone: Macmillan 
Press, 1998).
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By announcing the full-scale Pacific battle to national listeners, he initiated 
Australia’s first independent declaration of war in this original broadcast.56 A 
limited content analysis of the speech text was made to identify keywords. Curtin 
appealed to a sense of national identity, greeting his listeners by saying, ‘men 
and women of Australia’. Along with his references to the country, he repeated 
keywords about democracy, freedom, and liberty, which were familiar from 
Roosevelt’s earlier rhetoric.57 Although Roosevelt did not use these specific 
terms in his radio address on 8 December 1941, he attempted to instil hope 
in his listeners by talking of ‘righteous might’, ‘absolute victory’, ‘confidence’, 
‘determination’, and ‘triumph’.58 At the beginning of Curtin’s broadcast, it was 
clear that he was talking to ‘the people’ — rather than to other politicians and 
Allied leaders — and frequently used ‘we’, ‘us’, and ‘our’ that supported his 
inclusive tone.59 This strategy resembled the approach taken by Roosevelt 
in his Pearl Harbor announcement and ‘fireside chats’, which always began 
with some variant of a greeting to ‘My Friends’.60 Curtin also appeared to take 
care to make impersonal references to ‘Japan’, ‘the enemy’, and the war. He 
appealed to a sense of unity by affirming, ‘the common cause of preserv-
ing for free men and free women not only their inheritance, but every hope 
they have of decency and dignity and liberty’. Through its identification with 
‘free men and free women’ and the impersonal characterisation of a ‘ruthless 
and wanton’ aggressor, Curtin’s rhetoric was similar to Roosevelt’s oratory.61
Both leaders made last-minute amendments to their speeches which reso-
nated with audiences during the aftermath of the Pearl Harbor attacks. When 
Curtin was about to make his evening radio broadcast, he decided to include 
a brief quotation from the radical republican and Victorian English poet Alger-
non Charles Swinburne’s The Eve Of Revolution. The citation concluded his 
speech and ‘caused great interest among his friends’.62 He seemed to believe 
in the persuasive power of poetry to stir the Australian people to accelerate 
56 Alexander, “Interview”; Don Whitington, Strive to be Fair (Canberra: Australian National 
University Press, 1977); and, Oliver “Shaping the Nation”.
57 John Curtin, “National Broadcast by Prime Minister,” Digest 10 (1941): 19-22; and, 
“Universal Studios, Roosevelt newsreels,” (30 September 1934, 1938): http://www.
archive.org/details/WorldHistoryFranklinD.Roosevelt-SixFiresideChats1933-1938
58 F. D. Roosevelt, “Joint Address to Congress Leading to a Declaration of War Against Japan,” 
Franklin D. Roosevelt Presidential Library and Museum (1941): http://docs.Rooseveltl brary.
marist.edu/oddec7.html
59 Curtin, “National Broadcast,” 19-22.
60 Lim, “Lion,” 453.
61 Curtin, “National Broadcast,” 19-22; and, F. D. Roosevelt, “Joint Address to Congress”.
62 The Herald, 9 December 1941, from Scrapbooks, np.
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wartime production in defence of their country. The Prime Minister ‘wrote 
the quotation from memory a few minutes before his broadcast began, be-
cause he thought it peculiarly appropriate as an invocation to the Australian 
people’, according to an anonymous Herald journalist.63 In the article, Curtin 
was praised for ‘his stirring appeal’ and for choosing Swinburne’s five lines 
because of their ‘remarkable application to modern aerial warfare’.64 On the 
same date as the Australian broadcast, Roosevelt delivered his radio address 
in the US Congress at 12.30pm and, for the first time, a President was directly 
including national listeners in his request for a declaration of war. He used 
his ‘reading copy’ of a typewritten draft that included his revisions. Roosevelt 
changed his critical first line about the bombings by replacing the phrase, ‘a 
date which will live in world history’, with the stronger description, ‘a date which 
will live in infamy’, to intensify the sense of Allied outrage at Japan’s military 
government.65 While historians recognised the important role of speechwrit-
ers to enhance the two leaders’ popularity, Curtin and Roosevelt developed 
reputations for their eloquent, original writing styles when preparing citizens 
for the Pacific War.Using the aforementioned quantitative analysis, this study 
calculated that Curtin’s radio address registered a Flesch readability score 
of 57.4, fairly close to the recommended public speaking standard of sixty to 
seventy.66 Roosevelt’s speech was more complex, registering 45.5 (the lower 
number indicating a more difficult text), perhaps because he addressed the 
Congress as well as radio listeners. His ‘fireside chats’ were an average score 
of 57.5; altogether Roosevelt’s other public addresses were an average of 
59.4. Therefore Curtin’s declaration of war resembled Roosevelt’s ‘fireside 
chats’ in terms of the rhetoric, the level of accessibility and reading ease.67
On the Flesch-Kincaid scale, Curtin’s radio text was 9.4, meaning it was ap-
propriate for ninth graders.68 Although the speech was slightly more complicated 
than the recommended eighth-grade level, it was not unreasonably high given 
Australia’s compulsory education system, when the statutory leaving age was 
63 Ibid.
64 Ibid.
65 US National Archives and Records Administration, ‘Teaching with Documents’ (2009), 
http://www.archives.gov/education/lessons/day-of-infamy (retrieved on 23 March 2010).
66 Curtin, “National Broadcast”; and, Lim, “Lion”.
67 Curtin, “National Broadcast”; Lim, “Lion”; and,  F. D. Roosevelt, “Joint Address to Congress”.
68 Curtin, “National Broadcast”.
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fourteen in 1941.69 On average, Australians born before 1930 completed 9.3 
years of schooling.70 My study suggests that Curtin deliberately aimed his ad-
dress at working-class listeners. Roosevelt’s broadcast was more complex, 
with a Flesch-Kincaid score of 11.5, meaning it was suitable for eleventh-grade 
students. Since Roosevelt addressed politicians as well as workers, he named 
specific Pacific locations that were bombed during the “surprise offensive” to 
persuade his diverse audiences to support a declaration of war.71
Both leaders seemed to know how to deliver their oratory at an effective pace 
for their target audiences. During his broadcast, Curtin spoke 119.4 words per 
minute.72 His speech rate in the thirteen-minute talk was fairly close to prescribed 
standards that ranged between one hundred and one hundred and twenty-five 
words a minute.73 After developing a reputation as a ‘street corner speaker’ in 
his youth, when he was actually a very fast communicator, Curtin talked calmly 
with Australians in his radio address.74 In comparison, Roosevelt spoke for six 
minutes and was reportedly interrupted by ‘wild and thunderous applause and 
cheers’ in the joint session of Congress.75 Therefore he spoke 86.6 words a 
minute; his pauses emphasised the drama and import of his words.76 On aver-
age, Roosevelt’s speaking rate during the ‘fireside chats’ was calculated to be 
117 words a minute.77 While Roosevelt’s speech was more complicated than 
Curtin’s broadcast, both leaders appeared to speak more slowly than they 
normally did to emphasise their inclusive, democratic keywords about hope, 
unity and a strong defence.
In like manner to Roosevelt’s newsreels for ‘average’ men and women, Curtin 
spoke directly to the camera to address cinema audiences.78 In an Australian 
Cinesound Productions film, Curtin used the same keywords about a war for 
69 S. R. Carver, Year Book Australia, 1941 (Canberra: Commonwealth Bureau of Census and 
Statistics,1942), http://www.abs.gov.au/AUSSTATS/abs@.nsf/DetailsPage/1301.01941?O
penDocument
70 Jonathan Kelley and M. D. R. Evans, “Trends In Educational Attainment In Australia,” WwA: 
Worldwide Attitudes (1996), http://www.international-survey.org/wwa_pub/articles/hst-ed5.
htm
71 F. D. Roosevelt, “Joint Address to Congress”.
72 Curtin, “National Broadcast”.
73 Kenny, A Handbook of Public Speaking; and, Lim, “Lion”.
74 Bobbie Oliver, Unity is Strength: A History of the Australian Labour Party and the Trades 
and Labour Council in Western Australia, 1899-1999 (Perth: API Network, 2003), 66; and, 
The Herald 4 October, 1941, from Scrapbooks, np.
75 The Argus, 10 December 1941, 5.
76 F. D. Roosevelt, “Joint Address to Congress”.
77 Lim, “Lion”.
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freedom, liberty, and ‘civilisation’. Newsreel commentator, Peter Bathurst, told 
moviegoers that, ‘[r]ight up to the outbreak of this colossal war, too many of our 
experts of our time depreciated the value of air power’.79 Curtin was portrayed 
as the film’s hero, who indicated his open, honest manner by raising his hands 
and placing them on the table where he was seated before he announced: ‘we 
are face to face with the struggle for sheer existence’.80 To strengthen the impact 
of his words, the camera crew moved to a close-up shot while he declared the 
upcoming 1941 Christmas season ‘will be a period of a stern, ruthless war’ 
that did not allow ‘holiday making’.81 Contrasting with the ‘depreciated’ war 
effort commentary, he persuasively addressed ‘men and women here in the 
homeland’ as his colleagues and asked them to ‘keep the workshops active, 
to maintain the stream of munitions to our gallant fighting forces. I say to you: 
You must not waste one single hour or even one single minute’. As the camera 
returned to a medium shot, he continued describing his objective to maintain 
Australia as ‘a free citadel for the people’ and ‘an outpost for civilisation’.82 
These camera techniques were similar to those used by Roosevelt during his 
1930s ‘fireside chats’ newsreels, when he spoke directly to the camera at eye 
level, with his hands placed on the table before him to signify his straightfor-
ward manner and a candid connection with his audiences. Also Roosevelt was 
framed in close-up and medium shots to convey a personal relationship with 
US moviegoers.83 Both leaders seemed to have approved of film techniques 
that emphasised their direct communications to working-class moviegoers.
Their visual images contrasted in other ways. As a Labor leader, Curtin 
‘deliberately had his suits cut very conservatively’ to evoke ‘a very serious 
appearance’.84 Newspaper photographs and films frequently showed him 
in a stiff, white collar, plain ties, dark waistcoat, matching jacket and hat. 
His ‘austere’ style was noticed by Australia’s Sunday Sun ‘FACT Canberra 
Correspondent’, who wrote light-heartedly that he was not concerned about 
clothes rationing because he had ‘never been a fancy dresser’.85 ‘Honest 
John’ Curtin’s reputation appeared to resonate with many 1940s American 
79 Ibid.
80 Ibid.
81 Ibid.
82 Cinesound Productions, War in Pacific! (JCPML, 1941).
83 Universal Studios, “Newsreels” (1933, 28 June 1934).
84 Rodgers, “Interview,” np.
85 The Sunday Sun, JCPML (14 June 1942), http://john.curtin.edu.au/behindthescenes/ms/
text/curtin.html; and, Time, 24 April 1944, JCPML.
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audiences and his picture as well as an accompanying ‘boxing kangaroo’ 
icon appeared on a Time 1944 magazine cover, for instance.86 Moreover 
US magazine companies used his image in their advertisements, including 
posters in New York subway cars.87 Curtin’s cultivated appearance as a ‘man 
of the people’ differed from international media images of Roosevelt with 
his cigarette holder, aristocratic pince-nez glasses and open convertible.88 
In Australia, newspaper editors portrayed the Curtin and Roosevelt broadcasts 
on the Pacific War positively. On 9 December 1941, Curtin’s radio talk was 
publicised as ‘vital’ on page one of The Sydney Morning Herald; as ‘important’ 
on the cover of The Age; as well as announcing ‘[d]rastic plans’ and ‘a total 
war footing’ in The Canberra Times.89 His speech was reproduced almost 
verbatim in The Sydney Morning Herald; likewise his keywords were reported 
substantially in The Age, The Canberra Times and The West Australian.90 All 
four newspapers included supportive ‘leaders’ — also known as editorial com-
ments — headlines and smaller articles related to the broadcast. ‘The Prime 
Minister knows how and where Australian interests have to be protected’, The 
Canberra Times leader writer stated.91 Curtin ‘has developed the qualities of 
real leadership’ by ‘acting with promptitude and energy’, The Sydney Morning 
Herald editorial writer commented.92 In a front-page article, The Canberra Times 
recognised Australia was involved in a new war, a new world order — another 
keyword in the radio speech — that needed the support of ‘everyone’ in the 
nation.93 Moreover, positive editorials appeared in another six metropolitan 
dailies across the nation.94 While it was not surprising that a violent battle 
would receive wide media attention, it was unusual that several conservative 
Australian publishers would endorse a Labor leader. By emphasising Curtin’s 
keywords of nationhood, the Australian people and war, the editors conveyed 
a sense of civic duty and desire for national unity.
86 Time, 23 August 1943, 30 August 1943, 24 April 1944, JCPML, np.
87 Mirror, from Scrapbooks, 9 October 1942.
88 Granada Media, Roosevelt (JCPML, 1990); and, Screensound Australia, “A Great Australian 
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90 WA, 9 December 1941, 6.
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Likewise Roosevelt’s broadcast generated favourable press coverage in 
three selected Australian newspapers.95 Australian newspaper readers 
were told that he spoke in ‘firm, ringing tones’ with ‘a note of implacable 
determination’.96 During their regular news interviews, Roosevelt and Curtin 
briefed journalists about the US naval losses at Pearl Harbor; reporters co-
operated with censorship policies by withholding the information.97 Although 
Curtin and Roosevelt were aided by this suppression of news, they secured 
journalists’ support through their use of regular, open and informal brief-
ings, their inspiring rhetoric, as well as their successful use of radio and film.
As Prime Minister, Curtin made forty broadcasts and possibly more radio talks 
during his terms from 7 October 1941 to 5 July 1945.98 Therefore this study has 
calculated that he made about twelve significant Prime Ministerial radio talks 
each year. In the US, Roosevelt delivered his 110 Presidential radio speeches 
from 4 March 1933 to 12 April 1945.99 Thus Roosevelt made about nine radio 
talks each year during his Presidential terms. Australia’s leader talked more 
frequently to radio listeners than Roosevelt, who was well known for his ready 
acceptance and use of media technology.
While Australian polling was new in 1941 and media organisations had not yet 
developed sophisticated, interactive tools to measure public opinions, some 
readers wrote ‘letters to the editor’ and similar correspondence to affirm they 
had changed their anti-Labor allegiances and supported Curtin.100 After Roos-
evelt’s ‘day of infamy’ speech, US navy, army and marine headquarters report-
edly ‘were besieged with volunteers’, seeking to enlist for military service.101 
By January 1942, Roosevelt’s public approval rating was 84 per cent and 
another survey found 73 per cent of respondents approved his handling of 
95 The Argus, TCT, SMH, 10 December 1941.
96 The Argus, 10 December 1941, 5.
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foreign policy in May 1943.102 The next year he was elected to an unprec-
edented fourth Presidential term. In an Australian survey, eight out of ten 
voters said they ‘were satisfied or more than satisfied with Curtin’s job as 
Prime Minister’ in August 1942.103 During the 1943 Federal election, Cur-
tin won 66.9 per cent of the votes in his Fremantle electorate. Some 78 
per cent of Australians supported his leadership.104 These types of polls 
indicated the leaders’ mass media strategies were successful in attract-
ing broad support from both the left and the right of the political spectrum.
media visionaries paved the way for current political communications
By developing unique journalism strategies, Roosevelt and Curtin established 
precedents in political communication. These innovations included the role of 
the full-time press secretary, informal, ‘off-the-record’ news briefings, as well 
as using relatively new electronic media to connect with national and overseas 
audiences. Their use of visual strategies, dramatic rhetoric, and rehearsed ges-
tures enabled Curtin and Roosevelt to represent themselves in popular media 
culture as being both forceful leaders and democratic ‘men of the people’. 
Through the case study of the news management of the Pearl Harbour bomb-
ing, this article compared the Curtin and Roosevelt journalism strategies to 
identify their unique qualities and discover lessons for modern-day political 
communications. Although written hastily amid the chaos of war, Joseph Alex-
ander’s diaries opened new views of Curtin’s unique, day-to-day interactions 
with journalists, particularly his confidential warnings about the imminent Pearl 
Harbor disaster. Such close relations between an Australian Prime Minister, 
press secretary and journalists were unprecedented. While Roosevelt and 
Curtin benefited from wartime censorship, they also secured many reporters’ 
cooperation by developing egalitarian, respectful relationships. 
Perhaps because both leaders had some experience in newspaper journalism, 
they skilfully used the relatively new media of radio and newsreels to commu-
nicate their common Pacific War objectives to mass audiences. Through their 
gestures, direct addresses to the film camera, and rhetorical appeals to the ‘av-
erage’ person in close-up, eye-level shots, they conveyed a friendly, warm and 
102 George Gallup, The Gallup Poll, vol. 1 (New York: Random House, 1972). 
103 The Courier-Mail, from Scrapbooks, 14 August 1942, np.
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personal relationship with moviegoers. Even though they relied on speechwrit-
ers, they added original amendments that seemed to amplify their war messages 
effectively, based on the positive press coverage of their statements in selected 
metropolitan Australian newspapers. Although their speeches were higher than 
recommended reading levels, they reflected similar keywords and inclusive 
language about hope, nationhood and defence to inspire their nations to protect 
Australia. Curtin seemed to slow his speech rate deliberately in his radio broad-
cast while Roosevelt’s measured, reassuring pace belied his anger. Opinion 
polls and the evaluation of press coverage indicated both leaders were success-
ful in persuading many journalists and public audiences to accept their war aims. 
Roosevelt and Curtin set journalism precedents still used today, even with the 
greater turnover of news, the faster media cycle and the extra demands on 
journalists and politicians. Their innovative styles created a legacy evident in 
contemporary political communications. Political leaders can generate favour-
able news coverage by talking informally, openly, and frequently to journalists, 
by using the latest technology to communicate to public audiences at home and 
overseas, along with focusing on positive policies to achieve their objectives 
of setting media agendas.
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